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Since the early 2000's, a strategic sourciiig tool called rrv(�i-s(�auction Ikks 
been piovcMi to be effective and efficient for buyers to select the lowrst-prkr 
srllcr from the pool of qualified suppliers. In this thesis. \v(�address the 
sotting of a reverse auction for a product in multi-period operations. To 
maximize the cxpccted profit, the buyer can hold an en try-fee reverse�auction 
to (lotcu'ininc the optimal total ()r(l(�r quantity coininitinent (TOCJC) and the 
lowrst unit i)urcha.sing price jointly, taking many common operational costs 
into consideration (such as iiiv(�iit()ry holding cost, backlog cost and salvage 
vahio). It is shown that tlio TOQC can l)o optiiiially d(�t(�i,iiiiii(�(i l)y th(> 
n�\’(�i-s(�auction iiiechaiiisni. and tli(�optimal inventory r('j)l('nisliiii('iit nil(� is 
of siiiiplo strurtmv. Xuiiunical rxpciinieiits show that. profit iniprox'ciiiciit 
can h(�substantiated from our iii()d(�l when coinpaKxl with the fix(�(i-(iimiititv 
r(�\-t�rs(�auction. The iiiiportaiK.r. llie heiiofits and tli(> fartors of success for 
holding n�\-(�rs(�auctions aiv also discussed. 
Kt>v words: Procuroiiioiit iiiaiiag(�in(�m. R(‘vrrsr auction. Iiivcntorv iikmIcI 




方利用這種有效及髙效率的策略性購買工具(strategic sourcing tool)去從一 
群合資格的供應商裡選出最低定價的賣方。這篇論文針對逆向拍賣在多周 
期性運作的應用作出建構。這個模型會同時決定最優的總購買承諾(total 
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1.1 Importance of Reverse Auctions 
Procurement constitutes the body of integrated activities that focuses on 
the procurement of materials, components, goods and services needed to 
realize the organizational goals. In a narrow sense, procurement describes the 
‘ p r o c e s s of buying; in a broader context, it involves: (1) determining the need, 
(2) selecting the qualified suppliers with satisfactory quality and conditions, 
(3) determining the appropriate price and quantity, and (4) following up 
deliveries. In general, procurement's objectives can be summarized around 
the "eight rights": right source, right quality, right goods/services, right 
quantity, right price, right delivery time, right delivery place and right after-
sale service. 
When purchasing goods and services, a buyer usually lets her suppliers 
compete for her business in order to make sure that a good deal is obtained. 
Competition is the key to unlock favorable deals, and proffer the buyer the 
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best terms that the market can offer. Based on this rationale, reverse auctions 
is a useful tool for the buyer. 
In basic form, a reverse auction is an auction between a buying organi-
zation and a group of pre-qualified suppliers. The suppliers compete against 
each other to win the business by price. The business is to supply goods or 
services that have clear specifications for designs, quality, delivery and related 
terms and conditions. In common auctions, the supplier having the lowest 
production cost normally wins the contract. Nowadays, reverse auctions is 
usually held via the Internet. 
Guillemaud, Farris and Hooper [18] indicated that a properly executed 
reverse auction had the potential to yield a cost saving within a range of 12-24 
percent. Reducing the purchasing cost is directly related to the profitability 
of the buyer. For many organizations, the procurement costs of products 
and services are the most significant expenses, amounting to perhaps 45-55 
percent of the total cost. A five percent saving in procurements will result 
in up to 50 percent profit improvement for a firm that has a 5 percent profit 
margin. Therefore, the 12-24 percent cost saving can make a remarkable 
profit improvement. Moreover, based on the interviews conducted with 41 
purchasing professionals, Smeltzer and Carr [34] concluded that an average 
saving in the range of 25-35 percent of cycle time was the most common. Also, 
with electronic reverse auctions, the buying process becomes transparent and 
fair. It avoids the appearance of unethical or compromising practices in terms 
of inter-personal relationships, communications and actions. This further 
catalyzes the development of reverse auctions. In 2003, over 25 percent 
of the companies in the US used reverse auction technology to lower their 
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purchasing costs and over 50 percent of them would increase their use of 
reverse auctions and on-line e-procurement activities. 
1.2 A Research Gap in Existing Literatures 
Aberdeen Group's report [1] divided procurement into two primary cate-
gories: 
1. Strategic Sourcing - which involves the identification, evaluation, nego-
tiation, and configuration of products, services, and suppliers. 
2. Operational Procurement - which involves the organization, planning, 
and management of procurement and supply chain activities associated 
with acquiring the goods or services. 
As regards the former, many existing literatures, such as Bicher [7], Te-
ich et al. [36], and Li [24], characterized optimal procurement strategies in 
different reverse auction settings. Chen [10] investigated an optimal reverse 
auction model in a newsvendor setting. He studied the integration of the 
quantity decision of a product and the discovery of its price to satisfy a 
single-period demand. However, there was a lack of research concerning re-
verse auctions (Strategic Sourcing) with multi-period inventory management 
(Operational Procurement) prior to this research. 
In multi-period operations, two possible deployments of Chen's newsven-
dor model [10] can be considered. First, a reverse auction is set up each 
period to serve the demand in that period. It will incur the expenses for 
holding a reverse auction and changing suppliers every period. Unless the 
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money saved from reduction of purchasing cost can cover the expenses, it 
is not economic to use the newsvendor setting in multi-period operations. 
Second, a single reverse auction is held for serving demands over multiple 
periods. In this case, the buyer can order goods each period. The opti-
mal quantity decided by the auction mechanism represents the total order 
quantity commitment (TOQC) throughout the periods. However, in Chen's 
framework, during the decision-making process, the operational costs, i.e. 
holding cost, shortage cost, have not been considered. 
1.3 Research Focus 
In view of this, we generalize the model of Chen [10] using a single reverse 
auction in a multi-period replenishment setting. To maximize the expected 
profit, the buyer sets up a reverse auction at the beginning to determine the 
lowest unit price of the goods and the optimal purchasing quantity jointly. 
The quantity will be treated as the TOQC the buyer will procure from the 
winning supplier throughout the contract period. During the decision-making 
process, the buyer assumes that the optimal dynamic inventory policy is 
used to replenish the goods periodically and operational costs are taken into 
consideration. 
The generalized model gives the buyer the right to decide the duration 
of the contract. If the buyer expects the purchasing price can be reduced in 
the near future, she will shorten the duration of each contract. In extreme 
case, the buyer holds a reverse auction every period and therefore the model is 
reduced to a newsvendor setting. On the other hand, if the buyer expects that 
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the purchasing price remains the same or even rises due to fierce shortage, a 
single reverse auction should be used to serve non-stationary demands in a 
longer duration. 
1.4 Contributions of This Thesis 
The main contribution of this thesis is that the reverse auction model of 
Chen [10] is extended from a newsvendor setting to a multi-period replen-
ishment setting with some modifications. And it is shown that the optimal 
TOQC and the lowest unit purchasing price can be discovered jointly, with 
considerations of multi-period operational costs under the optimal replen-
ishment policy. From another point of view, we successfully integrate the 
reverse procurement auction, a strategic sourcing tool, with a common op-
erational procurement practice, namely the multi-period dynamic inventory 
replenishment management with TOQC. 
1.5 Organization of This Thesis 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. The coming chapter gives 
a brief literature review. The reverse auction model and the multi-period 
replenishment model with TOQC will be formulated in Chapter 3. Chapter 
4 will go a step further to integrate the replenishment model into the reverse 
auction setting. Then, in Chapter 5, the revised model will be presented. 
Numerical analysis will be provided in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 concludes the 
model and proposes the future work. 
5 
Chapter 2 
Background and Literature 
Review 
In this chapter, some background about procurement strategies, especially re-
verse auctions, and multi-period inventory replenishment models with TOQC 
will be given. In between, some related literatures will be stated. 
2.1 Review of Reverse Auctions 
There are a number of handbooks giving comprehensive knowledge of pro-
curement, e.g. Weele [39] and Monczka et al, [27]. Anderson and Katz [2] 
recognized that procurement has been playing an important role in help-
ing major corporations achieve their saving and profitability objectives. El-
maghraby [15] provided an overview of the research that has been done in the 
fields of operations research and economics on the topic of sourcing strate-
gies. According to her study, buyers perceive that they receive the best price 
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of a product by sole sourcing because of the economies of scale their suppli-
ers can get. At the same time, buyers also want to introduce competitions 
among their suppliers in order to reduce procurement costs. If it is so, reverse 
auctions will be exactly what they want. 
In the ten-year forecast for the purchasing industry, Carter et al. [9] pre-
dicted that reverse auctions will be one of the industry trends. It continues to 
be used to ascertain true market prices and award business. Many companies 
will procure non-strategic items through reverse auctions. 
Auctions has been used since time immemorial for the sale of a variety 
of objects. Some believe that auctions was used in Babylon as early as 500 
B.C. Today both the range and the value of objects sold by auctions have 
grown to incredible proportions. Numerous kinds of goods ranging from fish, 
fresh flowers, gold, long-term securities, the right to use public resources and 
the freedom to use the electro-magnetic spectrum for mobile communication 
are sold by means of auctions. 
Myerson [28] made a breakthrough in his contribution to the optimal 
auction literature, i.e. the identification of an auction structure that enables 
the auction organizer to attain the optimal of a criterion (e.g. maximize the 
seller's revenue, minimize the buyer's purchasing cost etc). 
McAfee and McMillan [25] and Milgrom and Weber [26] provided an excel-
lent overview of general auction literatures, with particular emphasis on the 
performance of commonly used auction formats (English, Dutch, first-price 
sealed-bid and Vickrey auctions) in the sale of one indivisible unit for sym-
metric bidders. Auctions can be either "open" or "close". In open auctions, 
prices are publicly announced and bidders can indicate their willingness to 
7 
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
transact at particular prices. In closed auctions, bidders submit offers simul-
taneously, and these offers are then evaluated by the auctioneer. The English 
auctions is an open auction in which the auctioneer solicits successively bet-
ter offers until no bidder is willing to make a better bid. Alternatively, in 
the Dutch auctions, which is usually used in Dutch flower markets, the auc-
tioneer announces successively lower prices until a bidder bids and thereby 
owns the product. In the Vickrey auctions, the winning bidder is the one 
who submits the best bid, but the price is set at the level of the second-best 
bid. Thus, it is also called a second-price sealed-bid auction. Similarly, in 
the first-price sealed-bid auction, the one submitting the best bid will pay 
the price she suggests. A recent and comprehensive survey of the auction 
literatures is by Klemperer [22] 
In each auction, there are buyer(s) on one side and seller(s) on the other 
side. One side will be the auction owner organizing the auction and let the 
other side submit bids. Based on that, there are mainly two kinds of auctions: 
Forward Auctions and Reverse Auctions. 
The forward auctions, in which the seller offers a product to numerous 
buyers, is the most common type. The seller "controls" the market because 
she is offering a product in demand by a number of buyers. The price the 
buyers offer continues to increase until it reaches a theoretically rational 
price. Supply and demand set the price. 
The reverse auctions is the opposite, or reverse, of the traditional forward 
auctions. The desired item is offered by a number of suppliers, so the buyer 
"controls" the market. The price the sellers offer continues to decrease until 
a theoretical rational market price is achieved. 
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According to Smeltzer and Carr [34], the basic premise of a reverse auc-
tions is that a sufficient supply exists and the supplier's profit margin is 
ample enough to offer reduced prices. 
2.1.1 Benefits of Reverse Auctions to Buyers 
The market for procurement via the Internet is huge, most likely representing 
3 trillion US dollars in transaction by 2003, based on Verespej [38]. Of 
the major e-procurement methods, electronic reverse auctions is the most 
attractive one because it can be quickly implemented and provides benefits 
resulting from process improvement for participating suppliers and buyers. In 
the surveys conducted by Beall et al. [6], the growth rate in using electronic 
reverse auctions is 10 to 15 percent per year. 
Lower prices and a broader supplier base attract buyers to use electronic 
reverse auctions which have made a profound impact on the firms that source 
goods and services from current and potential suppliers. 
Carbone [8] indicated that, not too long ago, electronic buyers viewed 
electronic reverse auctions strictly as a way to get lower prices from global 
suppliers. Today they see it as a time-saving instrument that lets them 
focus on supplier quality issues, vendor-managed inventory programs, and 
on contract negotiations. It quoted from Rick DeHart, Vice-President of 
worldwide procurement at Scientific Atlanta, "My staff has been reduced 
significantly over the years. We have been able to do that with a smaller 
staff because of online tools. That is a significant efficiency improvement." 
What's more, DeHart has been able to empower his buyers to work on more 
strategic sourcing issues. Reverse auctions "allow your people to negotiate 
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not only on pricing, but on some other terms and conditions, and address 
vendor-managed inventory programs, payment terms and supplier quality 
issues." 
In the same article, Carboiie [8] indicated that Motorola has benefited not 
just from a cost standpoint, but also from a productivity standpoint. Mo-
torola, which purchases about 1,000 types of semiconductor with 2.8 billion 
US dollars through reverse auctions, has reduced the cycle time for quoting 
by about a third. 
These kinds of cost savings and efficiency improvements are prompting 
more companies to use more electronic reverse auctions. 
Semeltzer and Carr [34] pointed out that the reduction of inventory level is 
another incentive for buyers to use reverse auctions, which allows inventories 
to be quickly replenished and thus less safety stock is needed. 
According to Tulder and Mol [37], Philips conducted an investigation and 
found that its supplier's selling price might not be competitive any more. 
The electronic auctioning process drove Philips to review its suppliers and 
its entire product portfolio in a structured manner. They concluded that, if 
Philips had monitored market developments more closely, it might have been 
tempted to consider switching earlier. The most intriguing question arising 
from this case study is why nothing has changed for so long. Viewed in this 
way, the primary function of electronic reverse auctions for them is to speed 
up the processes that were somehow inevitable. Electronic reverse auctions 
is a carrier or a catalyst of changes rather than an engine for changes. 
In addition, larger companies are more likely to use reverse auctions as 
suggested by Carbone [8]. The reason behind is that large companies have 
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good negotiating positions with their suppliers. 
2.1.2 Types of Reverse Auctions 
In traditional auction mechanism, the matching of the buyer and sellers on 
a single item is typically based only on price. As reverse auctions is getting 
more and more common, many different kinds of mechanisms have been 
proposed in recent years. 
One active field of research is the multi-attribute auction. In such a set-
ting, there are multiple dimensions of a transaction, such as price, quantity, 
quality, services, terms of delivery, payment, warranty, etc. All these needs to 
be incorporated through the auction mechanism. Teith et al. [35] reviewed 
the burgeoning field of multiple-attribute auctions and discussed their de-
sign features and performance criteria. Bichler [7] suggested formulating the 
problem as maximizing the buyer's utility function, U(xi) = J2j=i ^j(^i)^ 
where Uj are single dimensional utility functions defined over the set of bid-
der attributes Xi. Teich et al. [36] suggested "pricing out" other attributes 
besides price and quantity. Negotiable Bid Issues (NBI) are issues besides 
price and quantity that bidders will include in the actual bid, such as war-
ranty and delivery terms. Discounts di，0^2，…，may be applied to different 
levels of such issues ai, a2 , . . . , a^ by the auction owner. That is, the auction 
owner is asked to compare vectors of attributes and identify the discount d* 
that would make her indifferent between two bundles, such as (d*, a*) and 
((i^, However, both of the methods require intensive human involvement. 
Another extension of reverse auction mechanism is the development of 
the multiple-unit auction. The single-unit auction is not the most common 
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or interesting auction mechanism in terms of practical perspective. Bapna 
et al. [4] and Rothkopf and Harstad [33] pointed out that the strong theo-
retical results obtained from isolated single-unit auction are not necessarily 
transferable to more complicated multiple-unit situations. Hence, there have 
been several extensions to the traditional auction paradigm in recent years. 
In every reverse auction, both the purchasing quantity and the unit pur-
chasing price need to be determined. Chen [10] studied optimal procurement 
strategies that the buyer specifies a transfer payment for each possible pur-
chase quantity and delegates the quantity decision to the selected supplier. 
He proposed two auction mechanisms including the quantity reverse auction 
and the entry-fee reverse auction be used. 
For the quantity reverse auction, the buyer first announces a quantity-
payment schedule, which specifies the payment amount for each possible 
quantity the selected supplier may deliver. The potential suppliers submit 
quantity bids. The one with highest quantity bid wins the auction, produces 
and delivers the goods in the specified quantity, and receives a payment ac-
cording to the pre-announced quantity-payment schedule. However, Chen 
[10] showed that quantity auction must be conducted in the sealed-bid fash-
ion. Optimality is lost when implemented in other formats. 
Another reverse auction strategies takes the form of an entry-fee format. 
Here, the buyer announce her quantity-payment schedule at first. Taking 
the payment function offered by the buyer as their revenue function, poten-
tial suppliers view this supply contract as a business opportunity. Together 
with their own marginal production cost, they each determine an optimal 
quantity to produce and deliver to the buyer in order to maximize their own 
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expected profit. In this sense, different suppliers get different values for the 
supply contract. The suppliers compete for the supply contract in an auction 
by submitting an entry fee that they are willing to pay. The winner is, of 
course, the supplier who offers the highest entry fee with the lowest produc-
tion cost. The auction achieves the maximum expected profit for the buyer 
in either open format or sealed format. Li et aL[24] provided similar auction 
mechanisms, with the consideration of the supplier's capacity. 
In this thesis, the Chen's [10] entry-fee auction model will be extended 
into a multi-period setting. 
2.1.3 Implementation of the Entry-fee Reverse Auc-
tion 
In the entry-fee reverse auction, a buyer's operation requires a supply that 
must be procured from one of the qualified suppliers. There are multiple 
potential suppliers who privately observe their marginal production costs. 
But the buyer is unsure about the suppliers' production costs. Usually, the 
buyer will ask the suppliers to submit bids for the right to supply. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we define the procurement process as follows: 
1. determining the needs 
2. selecting qualified suppliers with satisfactory quality and conditions 
3. determining appropriate price and quantity 
4. following up deliveries 
Implementing the entry-fee reverse auction involves similar procedures. 
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Determining the Needs 
According to Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis [3], not all goods are suitable for 
procuring in reverse auctions. In general, goods can be classified into two 
categories. Standardized goods, such as clocks, washing machines and DVD 
players, have standardized characteristics. Customized goods, such as new 
buildings, rockets and consulting services, are not always sufficiently detailed. 
With regard to standardized goods, competitive bidding (another name of 
reverse auctions) can give a rather good performance. Many brand-owners, 
nowadays, procure standardized goods from some Original Equipment Man-
ufacturers (OEM) by using reverse auctions and sell them in their brand 
name. However, reverse auctions performs poorly when the product designs 
are incomplete or post-adjustments are required. Negotiation is suggested 
for customized goods. 
Only one supplier is selected for each auction. The buyer needs to prepare 
her contingency plan in case the winning supplier cannot supply as expected. 
Luckily, since those goods are standardized, it is rather easy to procure from 
other suppliers. And the contracted supplier needs to pay for the extra cost 
for procuring the rest of quantity commitment. 
Under the above circumstances, the standardized goods will be focused 
in this thesis. 
Selecting Qualified Suppliers with Satisfactory Quality and Condi-
tions 
After deciding the goods to be procured by reverse auctions, the buyer should 
build a specific Request For Quote (RFQ). It is a very detailed document that 
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is sent to potential suppliers to prepare them for bidding. It includes all the 
information that is needed for them to place competitive bids during the 
event. The bidding mechanism will be described in the RFQs. Since the 
unit price and the purchasing quantity can be easily quantified, they will be 
treated as the bidding attributes in the entry-fee reverse auction mechanism. 
The basic requirements of the desired quality, technical capabilities, services, 
delivery dependability, financial stability, reliability or after-sale services are 
also stated. 
The buyer should then keep close contact with the potential suppliers and 
check if the latter can meet all the requirements. Only those suppliers who 
can satisfy all the requirements are allowed to join reverse auctions. 
Determining Appropriate Price and Quantity 
By using the entry-fee reverse auction, the buyer can learn the optimal pur-
chasing price and quantity for maximizing her expected profit. 
Following up Deliveries 
According to Aberdeen Group's report [1], the above three steps are actually 
inside the area of strategic sourcing. The next step the buyer should look 
into is the aspects of operational procurement. In other words, the buyer 
should decide her replenishment policy for her daily operations. 
Conditions for Success of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction 
The entry-fee reverse auction is suitable if all the following criteria are met. 
Firstly, the dollar value of the specific purchase must be large enough to 
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justify the expense of holding an entry-fee reverse auction. Secondly, speci-
fications of the items or services to be purchased must be very clear to both 
the buyer and the suppliers. Thirdly, the market must consist of an ade-
quate number of competing suppliers for the goods. Lastly, the suppliers 
in the market must be technically qualified and actively want the contract. 
Therefore they are willing to price competitively in order to get it. 
2.2 Linkage between the Entry-fee Reverse 
Auction and the Multi-period Inventory 
Replenishment Model 
Performing multi-period operations must incur purchasing cost, holding cost, 
shortage cost, and salvage value. Therefore, when an entry-fee reverse auc-
tion is applied for multi-period operations, it may not be economic to order 
all the quantity at the beginning. Otherwise, it may incur a huge cost for 
holding those goods. In this sense, we can treat the optimal quantity de-
cided in the entry-fee reverse auction as TOQC. The buyer agrees to an 
obligation to procure the TOQC from the supplier over the per-determined 
period of time. Then, an optimal replenishment policy should be applied 
to place orders periodically. After the TOQC specified in the contract has 
been purchased, any additional end customers' demands can be satisfied by 
purchasing on an as-ordered basis from the spot market. 
16 
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2.3 The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment 
Model with TOQC 
Throughout multi-period operations, the buyer should follow an optimal re-
plenishment policy to make appropriate orders. During the decision-marking 
process, several operational costs (such as inventory cost, backlog cost and 
salvage value) and the remaining quantity commitment should be consid-
ered. Bassok and Anupindi [5] considered a stochastic inventory model with 
TOQC under periodic review. They identified the structure of the optimal 
purchasing policy with TOQC and showed that this structure was simple. 
Later, Chen and Krass [11] extended the model of Bassok and Anupindi 
[5] to a more general setting: non-stationary demand distributions, different 
purchasing prices for the commitment purchase and the as-ordered purchase. 
In our model, we assume that all the non-stationary demands should be 
satisfied. After the TOQC specified in the contract has been purchased, the 
buyer will take the extra quantity from the market at the as-ordered market 
price. The as-ordered market price is usually higher than the price for the 
TOQC. As there are two price levels and the demand is non-stationary, our 




The Basic Models 
This chapter first explores a special type of reverse auctions called the entry-
fee reverse auction, and then the multi-period inventory replenishment model 
with TOQC. 
3.1 Strategic Sourcing Methodology - The 
Entry-fee Reverse Auction 
In the entry-fee reverse auction, a buyer accepts bids from several potential 
suppliers and settles on the best offer. Information is exchanged among the 
buyer and suppliers in a private (i.e., hosted by a single company) or a public 
(i.e., with many firms) e-marketplace. The goal is to identify a procurement 
strategy that maximizes the buyer's expected profit. 
The buyer first announces a quantity-payment schedule {P{Q) function), 
which specifies the amount the buyer will pay for each possible value of quan-
tity. This business opportunity is likely to be valued differently by different 
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suppliers, with the lowest-cost supplier achieving the highest valuation. The 
supplier offering the highest up-front, lump-sum fee wins the bid, determines 
the optimal quantity, delivers the goods to the buyer and receives payment 
according to the pre-announced quantity-payment schedule. 
W e use the following notations: 
n - the number of suppliers 
Ci — the supplier i,s constant marginal production cost 
F{c) — the probability distribution of c G [c,c] 
/ ( c ) 一 the probability density function of c G [c, c] 
/(i)(c) 一 the probability density function of min{ci, 0 2 , … , c ^ } where / ( i ) ( c ) = 
n / ( c ) ( l — F ( c ) ” - i . (See Appendix A) 
Ci, C2 , . . . , Cn — the first lowest cost, the second lowest cost, and so on (re-
spectively) 
Q{c) — the buyer's purchasing quantity 
R{Q) - the buyer's expected revenue for Q units of input 
P{Q) - the quantity-payment schedule specifying the amount the buyer pay 
for each possible value of quantity 
Following assumptions are made for the model formulation. 
Assumption 3.1 The suppliers' cost of production are independent and 
identically distributed random variables from a probability distribution F 
over a finite interval [c, c]. (Symmetric Bidders) 
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Assumption 3.2 The suppliers each privately observe their marginal costs 
of production, but the buyer only knows the common probability distribution 
of the suppliers' marginal costs. (Information Asymmetric) 
Assumption 3.3 The buyer and the suppliers are risk neutral. 
They make decisions based only on their expected profits and ignore the 
risk. 
Assumption 3.1 to Assumption 3.3 are the basic assumptions for op-
timal auction design, see McAfee and McMillan [25]. 
Assumption 3.4 The suppliers have unlimited production capacities. 
It avoids the situation that any bidding strategy of the suppliers is af-
fected by the production capacities. And it is reasonable since the product 
purchased by reverse auctions are usually standardized goods with plenty of 
capacities. 
Assumption 3.5 R{Q) is a strictly concave function. 
It ensures the buyer can find the optimal quantity that maximize her 
profit for any production cost level c. In reality, it is usual that the marginal 
profit decreases when the quantity increases. So, assumption 3.6 is reason-
able. 
Notice that the notations marked with * are optimal to the winning sup-
plier, and the notations marked with ** are optimal to the buyer. 
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Take any payment function P(-) with P(0) = 0 and define 
v{c) - m a x P ( Q ) - c Q (3.1) 
as the valuation function of suppliers. Supplier i values the business oppor-
tunity at v{ci) = Ui, for z = 1,2, • • • , n. 
Since the supplier's marginal costs are independent and identically ran-
dom variable, the values Vi are independent and identically distributed ran-
dom variables. Consequently, the problem of choosing a supplier is like selling 
an object (the right for entry) to the highest bidder, where the bidders have 
independent, identically distributed valuations. From the revenue equiva-
lence theorem, the buyer obtains the same expected lump-sum fee from the 
the same supplier if she uses either the English auction, the Dutch auction, 
the sealed high-bid auction or the Vickrey auction. 
The winning supplier gets the right to decide the quantity offered and 
achieves the maximized profit by setting the quantity equals 
Q*{c) = argmaxQ>oP{Q) - cQ. (3.2) 
Suppose the buyer uses the English auction for supplier selection. That 
is, the suppliers openly bid on the fee they are willing to pay for the right to 
trade. Clearly, the supplier with the highest valuation (the lowest marginal 
cost) wins the auction and pays a lump-sum fee equal to the valuation of the 
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second-lowest-cost supplier. And let 
Vk = = (3.3) 
Thus, the buyer collects a lump-sum fee, V2, from the lowest-cost supplier. 
This supplier determines the trade quantity Q*(Ci) to maximize his profit. 
The trade gives the buyer revenues in the amount of R{Q*{Ci)) but costs 
her P(Q*(Ci)) . Therefore, the buyer's profit is 
n = i?(Q*(Ci)) - P (0* (Ci ) ) + Vi. (3.4) 
Since yi = P ( Q * ( C i ) ) - C i Q * ( C i ) , 
n 二 R{Q*{Ci)) - CiO*(Ci) - (VI - ^2). (3.5) 
We can also easily notice that Vi — V2 is the winning supplier's profit. 
Note from the optimization problem in (3.2) that Q*(c) is decreasing in c. 
Let Co be the minimum c with Q*(c) 二 0. If Q*(c) > 0 for all c € [c,c], then 
set Co 二 c. For any c > Co, Q*{c) = 0 and thus v{c) = 0 since P(0) = 0. If 
the lowest cost Ci > Co, the winning supplier will also produce zero quantity 
and get zero profit. The buyer will also get zero profit. On the other hand, 
if any c < c。，Q\c) > 0. Differentiating v{c) = P{Q*{c)) - cQ*(c), 
v i e ) = P'(Q*(c))0*'(c) - 0*(c) - cO*'(c). (3.6) 
As the winning supplier will choose an optimal Q* to maximize his profit, 
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the first order condition for the optimization problem in (3.1) will lead to 
P'(Q*(c)) = c. (3.7) 
Insert it into (3.6)，we get 
So, the winning supplier's profit equals 
Vi-V2 = v{Ci)-v{C2)= / Q*(c)(ic. (3.8) 
JCi 
Notice that the expected system-wide profits can be expressed as 
£ [ i ? (Q* ( c ) ) - cQ* ( c ) ] / ( i ) ( c )dc . (3.9) 
The supplier's expected profit equals 
寧 1 - 叫 = / V i - 叫 / ( I ) � r Q*{x)dx\dc. (3.10) 
Jc UCi � 
And the buyer's expected profit equals 
丑[n] = j : mQ*{c)) — cO*(c)] — [Fi - ^2]) Mc)dc. (3.11) 
Using the conditional probability density function of C2 given C\ = c (See 
Appendix B), the winning supplier's expected profit equals 
E[Vi -叫 
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=i :nF ' ic ) i l — F(c)广 ⑷ 血 办 
二 J~yF\c)dcf~l^(l'Q^{x)dx)in - l)F'{y){l - 嚇 叫 y 
=f^nF'{c)dcJ~y^F'{y){l — F ⑷广 2 办 ) ( n - ⑷ 血 
=/>F'(c)dc/;(-/；(! - F{y)r-'d{l - F(y)))(n - l)Q*ix)dx 
= - l)Q*{x)dx 
=/>F'(c)dc/;(l - F{x)r-'Q''{x)dx 
=J^Q%x)nF{x)il - F{x)r-'dx. 
Substituting this expected value of Vi - V2 into equation (3.11), we find that 
the buyer's expected profit equals 
E[U] = J\R{Q*{C))—互(c)Q*(c)]/�(3.12) 
where H{c) 
Note that H{Ci) represents as the virtual marginal cost of procurement 
for the retailer in the equilibrium point of the game. That is, the buyer 
supposes that the winning supplier with the lowest production cost Ci will 
ask for H{Ci) as the pre-unit procurement price. By Myerson [28], it is 
well known that E[H{Ci)]=丑[C2] (See Appendix C). Moreover, the above 
regularity holds if and only if H{c) is an increasing function, which we assume 
throughout the paper. See Chen [10] for a discussion and further references 
on the topic. 
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Although the above expression is obtained under the assumption that 
the buyer uses the English auction to select a winning supplier, we know, 
from the revenue equivalence theorem, that the same expression holds if she 
instead uses the Dutch auction, the first-price, sealed-bid auction, or the 
Vickrey auction. 
We define 
Q**(c) = argmaxQ>olR(Q)"互⑷Q]，Vc G [c,c]. (3.13) 
as the optimal quantity that the buyer hopes to receive. 
As R(Q) is a strictly concave function and / / ( c ) is increasing, the global 
optimum Q**(c) exists and Q**(c) is decreasing in c. Set c* equal to the 
minimum c G [c, c] with Q**(c) = 0. If no such c exists, set c* = c. c* is 
called the reserve price and represents the maximum production cost level 
acceptable to the buyer. For any c > c*, the quantity the buyer wants equals 
zero. 
However, the right to decide the quantity offered is in the hand of the 
winning supplier. If the winning supplier also follows this quantity function 
Q**(c) based on her marginal cost c, Q**(-) arises as a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in the auction. In order words, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists 
if the buyer's desired quantity function Q**(c) matches with the supplier's 
desired quantity function Q*(c). The reserve cost c* equals to c � i f the above 
condition holds. Moreover, it is clear from (3.12) that the buyer's expected 
profits are maximized. 
Now, the only question left is whether the winning supplier follows the 
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quantity function Q**{c) based on her marginal cost c. Remind that, in 
reality, the buyer should first announce a quantity-payment schedule {P{Q) 
function) and let the winning supplier to choose their desired quantity Q*. 
By substituting Q**{c) into the first order necessary condition for optimality 
of the supplier's valuation function (3.1), which is equal to 
P'(0**(c)) = c,Vc G [c,c] with Q**(c) > 0, (3.14) 
the buyer can drive the winning supplier to follow the quantity function 
Q**{c). And we denote this optimal quantity-payment schedule by P**{Q) 
Note that this optimal payment function P**{Q) is increasing in Q and a 
concave function in Q because Q**{c) is decreasing in c, and independent of 
the number of bidders n. 
3.1.1 Numerical Example 
We will use the following example to illustrate the model: 
Example 1: Suppose a retailer has a revenue function in the form R{Q)= 
20Q — 0.3(32. She realizes that the supplier's production cost follows an 
uniform distribution within the range [14, 16]. So, 
" � i r a ^ f 1 4 < c < 1 6 , 
/ (c)= < 
0 otherwise, 
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and 
0, if c < 14 
巧 c ) 二 ^ if 14 < c < 16， 
1 if 16 < c. 
The virtual marginal cost of procurement for the retailer is 
H{c) 二 c^F{c)/F\c) 
二 , 1 ( c - 1 4 ) / 1 
— (16 — 1 4 ) / ( 1 6 - 1 4 ) 
= 2 c - 14. 
The optimal quantity that the retailer hopes to receive equals 
Q**(c) = argmaxQ>o[R{Q) - F(c)Q],Vc G [c,c] 
=argmaxQ>ol20Q - - (2c - U)Q]. 
Since R{Q) is a concave function, it ensures the existence of global optimal 
Q, i.e., 
Q**(c) = 56.67 - 3.33c. 
The quantity-payment schedule should be the solution to 
P'(Q**(c)) = c,VcG [c,c] with 0**(c) > 0, 
= 1 7 - 0 . 3 Q . 
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Supplier Production cost Optimal quantity Valuation 
i Q Q^ Vj 
“ 1 14.1 9.67 14.02 
“ 2 — 14.5 8.33 ~ 1 0 . 4 2 
“ 3 — 14.8 7.33 ~ 8 . 0 7 
— 4 15.2 “ 6.00 5.40 — 
- 5 15.5 5.00 3.75 
- 6 15.9 3.67 2.02 
Table 3.1: (Example 1) The table of suppliers' costs, optimal quantities and 
valuations. 
Since P**(0) = 0， 
= —（0.3/2)(Q)2. 
Finishing the above analysis, the retailer will announce the above quantity-
payment function P**{Q). This business opportunity is likely to be valued 
differently by different suppliers. 
Suppose that six suppliers are interested in the auction as shown in Table 
3.1. Since the supplier with the highest valuation wins the auction and pays 
a lump-sum fee equal to the valuation of the second-lowest cost supplier, the 
winning supplier's (Supplier 1) profit is 
V1-V2 二 14.02 — 10.42 
二 3.6. 
28 
CHAPTER 3. THE BASIC MODELS 
Consequently, the retailer's profit is 
= 2 0 ( 9 . 6 7 ) - 0.3(9.67)2 — 14,1(9,57) _ 3.6 
= 2 5 . 4 . 
Having known that there are six suppliers competing for the auction, the 
retailer will get the highest expected profit which is equal to 
对n] = J\r{Q%c)) - H{c)Q*{c)]nF\c){l)dc 
广 1 6 
= / [20(56.67 一 3.33c) - 0.3(56.67 - 3.33c)^ 
Jl4 
- ( 2 c - 14)(56.67 - 3.33c)](6)(l/2)(c - 14)/2dc 
= 3 0 . 
3.2 Operational Procurement Methodology — 
The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment 
Model with TOQC 
In multi-period operations, there is a kind of supply contracts that a buyer 
agrees to an obligation to procure a specified TOQC of a product from a sup-
plier over the predetermined contract time. All consumer's demand should be 
satisfied. After the TOQC specified in the contract has been purchased, any 
additional units can be purchased on an as—ordered basis from the market. 
The replenishment decision will be under periodic review. In this section, 
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the optimal replenishment policy with TOQC will be discussed. 
W e use the following notations: 
N - number of periods, and time is counted backward 
^t 一 demand at time t, all the demands are serially independent 
(l)t{^t) - density function of demand in period t 
- probability distribution of demand in period t 
Qt - the size of the remaining commitment at the beginning of period t 
Q 一 initial commitment of the contract period, that is, Q = Qat 
Ut - the purchase quantity from the pool of the commitment in period t 
Note that, 
N 
Y^Ut = Q. (3.15) 
Vt - the purchase quantity from spot market in period t 
Xt - the inventory level at the beginning of period t 
Ut 一 the inventory position after ordering at period t with zero lead time 
Note that yt = Xt + ut + Vt 
71 一 the unit purchasing cost for the commitment 
72 — the unit purchasing cost for the order from the spot market 
'jH - the unit inventory holding cost for each period 
7p - the unit backlog cost for each period 
G{yt\t) - the one-period expected holding cost and backlog cost function of 
period t 
W{XQ) - the salvage value function at the end of the last period 
Z^*{xt, Qt) — the minimum expected total cost in period t 
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Following assumptions are made for the model formulation. 
Assumption 3.6 Setup cost for each purchase order is negligible. 
Assumption 3.7 G{yt\t) should be convex and unbounded as | ?/ oo. 
Let us see an example of the structure of G{yt\t). Usually, any leftover 
stock at the end of each period can be retained in inventory and offered 
for sale in the following period. Each unit of positive leftover stock at the 
end of each period incurs a holding cost of ^h in that period. Demand for 
product in excess of the amount stocked will be backlogged, which means 
that these customers will return the next period for the product. A unit 
backlog cost of j p is charged for each unit that is backlogged in each period. 
This shortage cost may incorporate the lost opportunity value of the delayed 
revenue, the additional cost required to place an expedited order, and the 
cost of lost goodwill. In this sense, G{yt\t) can be given as a function of the 
yt as follows: 
G{yt\t) = r iH{y - Omdi + 厂 - 2 / ) 術 K . (3.16) 
«/�=0 二々 y 
Assumption 3.8 At the end of last period, the residual inventory level Xq 
has scrap value W{XQ). It is assumed to be concave with W{XQ) = 72 • XQ for 
< 0 and with W'{XQ) < min[7i,72] for XQ > 0. 
The above assumption prevents the buyer from being intentionally over-
committed or overstocked for salvaging. 
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Assumption 3.9 Supply lead time is zero. 
We formulate the problem as a stochastic dynamic program with two 
state variables: the on-hand inventory (xt) and the remaining commitment 
(Qt)- The periodic purchase quantity from the commitment (ut) and the 
order-up-to-level (队)are the two decision variables in this model. 
The dynamic recursion is formulated as follows: 
= {7l购+72a/广工广o+<^�,H取z二l(2/厂<e“(^广0}• 
In each period, after observing {xt.Qt), the optimization problem is to 
make the decision {ut^ yt) by 
zr(而,QO 二 妃 , , 眾 一 力 ( " 厂 工 厂 ⑷ 
+G{yt\t) + — Qt - Ut)} (3.18) 
s.t. 
Qo) 二 7i0o - + Go), (3.19) 
Qt-i =Qt- Ut, (3.20) 
xt-i =yt — 6- (3.21) 
In Chen and Krass [11]，for this TV-period problem, they showed that 
the optimal replenishment policy is characterized by two critical numbers 
such that S^ > St.夕(and St) are the solution for the t-period 
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newsboy problems with the proportional ordering cost 71 (and 72) and the 
imputed per-unit salvage value 71 (and the assumed salvage value function 
w{-)) but without commitment. For each 亡= 1 , 2 , . . . , iV, the optimal replen-
ishment policy for commitment and as-ordered orders (denoted by u;* and 
v^*, respectively) is given by 
u** = V；* = 0 if xt > 
‘U；* = ST - Xt, V；' = 0 if XT < S^ and XT + QT> 
ur = Qu vV = [St - (Xt + Qt)V if xt^Qt< SK 
(3.22) 
Lemma 3.1 Looking at the optimal policy, we find that u^ * and v^ * are 
linear in Xt, Qt, St and 
Lemma 3.2 As the cumulative order quantities must be the same as TOQC, 
can be divided into two parts with one part equals j i Q . 
3.2.1 Numerical Example 
We will use the following example to illustrate the model: 
Example 2: Suppose a retailer usually orders a product from a supplier at 
the beginning of each month. Recently, the retailer is trying to decide the 
TOQC of the product for next half year. The supplier is offering the product 
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12 dollars per unit. And the retailer discovers that the spot market price 
for the product is 18 dollars per unit. The linear holding cost is 2 dollars 
per month. The linear shortage cost is 5 dollars per month. Any inventory 
left gets zero salvage value. Period demand follows normal distribution with 
mean 50 and standard deviation 5. 
5000 — V j 二〜‘：：；？'，…"^^^-^-^^ 
4500 ： ： , , J 
棚 H 
"'^l"}'丨丨丨丨丨丨I!l丨丨丨丨丨川丨I , , . 
3500 ：——：，；,,——；\ ' ： / / i 
% 30 � S 3 , … - 。 一 : 、 丨 
議 丨 丨 咖 I [ I : 丨 M l B E i … 丨 1 丨 I 
r^ r^l ^ r^ ^ r^ rf^ 發 ^^ ^ ^ ^ 妒 • 
Commitment quantity 
Figure 3.1: (Example 2) The relationship between the TOQC and the mini-
mum expected total cost. 
As shown in the figure 3.1, the retailer should set the TOQC = 296 units. 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
In the first part of this chapter, an optimal procurement strategy, called 
the entry-fee reverse auction, is formulated when the purchasing quantity 
is a decision variable and the unit purchasing price needs to be discovered. 
The buyer (the auction organizer) can achieve the highest expected profit 
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if she follows this optimal procurement strategy. The second part explores 
the inventory replenishment problem in which the buyer can purchase on a 
commitment basis and on an as-ordered basic. The buyer needs to ensure 
that her cumulative order quantities during the contract period is the same 
as the TOQC she makes at the beginning of the contract period. The opti-
mal replenishment rule is of simple structure. Two corresponding numerical 
examples are given to help readers understand these basic models. 
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Modifications Required for 
Integrating the Entry-fee 
Reverse Auction and the 
Multi-period Replenishment 
Model with TOQC 
In this chapter, modifications required for integrating the entry-fee reverse 
auction and the multi-period replenishment model with TOQC will be stated. 
In the new setting, the quantity decided by the entry-fee reverse auction is 
treated as TOQC for the contract period. After the costs for multi-period op-
erations are taken into account, the buyer's expected profit function should 
be revised. Therefore, we will first formulate the buyer's expected profit 
function and then see if the optimal TOQC exists and is computable. 
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THE ENTRY-FEE REVERSE AUCTION AND THE MULTI-PERIOD 
REPLENISHMENT MODEL WITH TOQC 
4.1 Formulation of the Buyer's Expected Profit 
Function in the Multi-period Setting 
The buyer's expected profit can be divided into two parts, one is the ex-
pected revenue and another is the expected cost. As we assume all the end 
customers' demands will be satisfied, the buyer's expected revenue should be 
equals where r represents the selling price of the product, ^ represents 
the sum of the demands during the contract period. 
Following the optimal replenishment policy suggested in section 3.2 and 
taking all the operational costs into account, Q*(C), H{C)) represents 
the minimum expected total cost of the buyer with initial inventory XN, the 
TOQC Q and the unit purchasing cost for the commitment H{c). Hence, 
the buyer's expected profit in multi-period setting equals 
率]二 j ^ V 刚 — ( 4 . 1 ) 
By Lemma 3.2, Z冗(OCN, <3*(c), H{C)) can be divided into two parts with 
one part equals H{c)Q. Therefore, we can re-organize the above formula into 
^[n] = jy^l^] - Z � N , H { c ) ) + 5 ( c )0* ( c ) — ^(c)g*(c)J/(i)(c)c/c. 
‘ (4.2) 
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REPLENISHMENT MODEL WITH TOQC 
Let 
R{r, XM, Q*(c),c) 二 rE[C] — Q*(c), H{c)) + H{c)Q{c) (4.3) 
and replace it into (4.2), the buyer's expected profit becomes 
E[n] = j:\R[r丄 XN,(nc),c)-互(c)Q*(c)]/(i)(c)dc (4.4) 
which is the same format as (3.12), the buyer's expect profit function we 
defined in section 3.1. 
In this sense, the entry-fee reverse auction mechanism mentioned in Chap-
ter 3 can most likely be applied in the multi-period setting. The questions 
left are whether rE[^] — Q*(C), H{C)) is a concave function in TOQC 
so that the optimal TOQC Q**{c) exists and the optimal TOQC can be 
computed for any supplier's production cost c. 
4.2 The Existence of Optimal TOQC 
Based on (4.1), define 
Q**(c) = argmaxQ>o[rE[^] — Z � n , 0 , H{c))] (4.5) 
as the optimal TOQC the buyer hopes to be received in the multi-period 
setting. 
In order to obtain the global optima (3**(c), rE[i] — Z；；(工jv, Q*(c),H(c)) 
should be a concave function in Q. Since rE[^] is a linear function in Q, the 
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REPLENISHMENT MODEL WITH TOQC 
work left is to show the second term Q) should be a convex function 
inQ . 
4.2.1 Convexity of the Last-period Optimality Equa-
tion 
We will first show the convexity of the last-period optimality equation. Re-
call that, at the beginning of each period, the buyer will observe the initial 
inventory Xt and remaining commitment Qt. After that, the decision of the 
order quantity for the commitment Ut and the order up to level yt will be 
made, and the expected total cost incurred from the current period t to the 
end equals 
(4.6) 
The optimality equation will be as follows 
Zrixt.Qt) = n 、 m i n biutJ2{yt - Xt - Ut) 
Qt>ut>0,yt>xt+ut 
^G{yt\t) + - Qt — t^t)} (4.7) 
s.t. 
Zo**Oro, Qo) = 71 Go - w{xo + Qo), (4.8) 
Qt-i=Qt-Uu (4.9) 
= y t - (4.10) 
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Lemma 4.1 If B{X) is a convex function, B{K^X) is jointly convex in X. 
Proof: 
B{aK^X + (1 - a)K^Y) = B{K^{aX + {1 - a)Y)) 
(Q.E.D) 
Proposition 4.1 The function Zl* {x i ,Qi ) is jointly convex with respect to 
a;i ’Qi. 
Proof: Re-write (4.6) for the last period, 
Zi{xi,QuUi,yi) 二 + (7i - 72)^ 1^ + 722/i 
+G{y,\l) + - 6 , Qi 一 …) } (4.11) 
where 
-^uQi- ui) = 71 -均）-W{Q, m), (4.12) 
and 
W{Qi — + 2/1) = E … ( Q i - u i + y i - 6 ) - (4.13) 
Note that the salvage value at the end of the last period w{x) is assumed 
to be a concave function in x. -W{Qi - lii + 2/1) is then jointly convex in 
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Qi, Wi,2/1 by Lemma 4.1. 
Hence, it is clear that E … * ( y i —6’ —购)is jointly convex in Qi ,ui ,y i 
and finally Zi(xi, Qi, Ui, pi) is jointly convex in Xi,Qi,Ui,yi as G{yi\l) is 
assumed to be a convex function. 
By Proposition B-4 of Heyman and Sobel [19], if Z i {x i ,Q i ,u i , y i ) is 
jointly convex in the optimality equation Zl*[xi ,Qi ) is jointly 
convex in Xi.Qi. 
(Q.E.D) 
4.2.2 Convexity of the Two-period Problem 
Next, we try to show the convexity of the optimality equations for the two-
period problem. 
Lemma 4.2 If fi(x),i 二 1’ …，m, are convex functions in x, the function 
/ O ) = rnax{ f i (x ) , . . . , f ^ (x ) } is also a convex function for x G x 
Proof Since FI{X),I 二 1’ …，m, are convex functions, for any X,Y E X 
and A € [0,1], we have 
/ ( ( 1 - A ) a : + 入 ⑴ = m a x { / i ( ( l - A)x + Xy\ / ^ ( ( l - A)x + A?/)} 
< m a ^ { ( l - A ) / i � + A/i(2/)，...， 
< ( 1 - 入 — { 嫩 ^ . ， 副 } 
+Amax{/ i (2/ ) , - . . Jm{y)} 
= ( 1 - A ) / ( x ) + A/(2/). 
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So, f{x) is also convex in x. 
Remark: In the above, the first inequality is achieved by the fact that 
maximum function is a non-decreasing function. The second inequality is 
achieved by the following properties: 
Let A = max{ai|z = 1 , . . . , n } then, 
max{ai + hi\i = 1 , . . . , n } < max{A + bi\i = 1,... ,n} 
= A + mdix{bi\i = 1 , . . . , n } 
= m a x { a i | i = 1 , . . . , n } + max{bi\i = 1 , . . . , n}. 
(Q.E.D) 
Proposition 4.2 The function Z2*{x2, Q2) is jointly convex in X2, Q2 
Proof: By Proposition 4.1, the function Zl* {x i ,Qi ) is jointly convex in 
Xi,Qi. Then we need to show Zl*{x i ,Qi ) is jointly convex in X2, Q2,'^2, 
We first divide the problem into two cases Qi > 0(u2 < Q2) and Qi = 
0(U2 > O2) 
Z r ( x i , Q i ) if Qi > 0, 
Z r ( x u Q i ) = < (4.14) 
Z r ( x u Q i ) if Qi 二 0， 
where 
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71O1 + 72(^1 - X i - Oi) + G(5i|l) - W{S^) 
� if 
Zr{xuQi) = \ (4.15) 
� i f < x i + 0 i , 
and 
八 if > x i , 
Z r M , ) = l — (4.16) 
G O r i l l ) - 释 1), 
if 
Note that when Qi > 0{u2 < Q2) then Xi,Qi are both linear in 2:2, Q 2 , 2 / 2 , 
thus by Theorem 5.7 of Rockafellar [32], we get that , Qi) is jointly con-
vex in X2,Q2,U2,y2- Similarly, when Qi = 0{u2 > Q2) then Xi.Qi are both 
linear in X2, Q2, 2/2, thus by the same theorem, we get that Zl*{xi ,Qi) is 
jointly convex in X2, Q2, 2/2-
Observe that if the functions Qi) and Zl*{xi,Qi) are both defined 
for Qi >0 then an alternative way to define Zl*{xi,Qi) is 
Z r { x u Q i ) = max Z**(xi, Qi), Z**(m, Qi). (4.17) 
Lemma 4.2 ensures that a function that is defined as the maximum (point-
wise) of several convex functions is convex. This proves that is 
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also convex in 2:2, Q2, 2/2. 
Hence, it is clear that Q2-U2) is jointly convex in Q2, 2/2 
and finally Z2O2，Q2,购,2/2) is jointly convex in 0C2,Q2,U2,y2 as G{y2\2) is 
assumed to be a convex function. 
By Proposition B-4 of Heyman and Sobel [19], if Q2,'^2,2/2) is 
jointly convex in ； 2^’ Qs,以2, "2, its optimality equation Z2*(x2, Q2) is jointly 
convex in X2, Q2-
(Q.E.D) 
4.2.3 Convexity of the N-period Problem 
Next, we try to show the convexity of the optimality equations for the N-
period problem. 
Proposition 4 .3 The function Z;*(jrt,Qt) is jointly convex in Xt and Qt if 
Z* l^ {x t -uQt - i ) is jointly convex in Xt -uQt - i 
Proof: We first need to show is jointly convex in Xt, Qt, Ut 
and yt. 
We first divide the problem into two cases Qt-i > 0{ut < Qt) and Qt-i = 
o(ut > Qt) 
Z;i,{xt-uQt-i) if Qt-i > 0, , � 
(4.18) 
Z*l,{xt-i,Qt-i) if Qt-i = 0, 
where 
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liQt-i + 72(^t-i — Xt-I - Qt-i) + G{St-i\t - 1) 
+ 丑 仏 1,0) 
� * * if 
7iut—i + G(xt- i + ut-ilt - 1) + 
+ Ut-i — ^t-i,Qt-i - ut-i) 
if S ' - ' < X t - i + Qt- i , 
(4.19) 
and 
72(St-i - xt-i)-h+G(St-ilt -
二2(St-i - 6-15 0) 
Z:i,{xt-uQt-i) 二 if > (4.20) 
G{xt-i\t - 1) + E“Z二工-
if S ' - ' < x t - i . 
Note that when Qt-i > 0(ut < Qt) then Xt-i,Qt-i are both linear in 
xt,Qt,Ut,yt，thus by Theorem 5.7 of Rockafellar [32], we get that Qt- i ) 
is jointly convex in Xt,Qt,Ut,yt. Similarly, when Qt-i = 0{ut > Qt) then 
Xt- i ,Qt- i are both linear in Xt,Qt,Ut,yt, thus by the same theorem, we get 
that Z*l^(xt-i,Qt-i) is jointly convex in cct, Qt, Ut, Vt-
Observe that if the functions 
Z ; i , { x t - i , Q t - i ) and Z ; i , { x t - u Q t - i ) are 
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both defined for Qt- i > 0 then an alternative way to define Zll-^{xt-i,Qt-\) 
is 
Z二i(:ct—i，Qt-i) = m a x 乏 二 i ( a : t _ i ， Q H ) , 乏 二 ( 4 . 2 1 ) 
Lemma 4.2 ensures that a function that is defined as the maximum (point-
wise) of several convex functions is convex. This proves that 
is also jointly convex in oct,Qt,Ut,yt. 
Hence, it is clear that Qt — ut) is jointly convex in Qt,Ut, yt 
and finally Zt(Xt,Qt,Ut,yt) is jointly convex in Xt,Qt,Ut,yt as G{yt\t) is as-
sumed to be a convex function. 
By Proposition B-4 of Heyman and Sobel [19], if Zt{xt, Qt, Ut, yt) is jointly 
convex in Xt,Qt,Ut,yt, its optimality equation Qt) is jointly convex in 
XUQF 
(Q.E.D) 
Theorem 4.1 By Proposition 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, using mathematical induction, 
we can show that Qt) is jointly convex in Xt and Qt ior t = 1,..., N . 
Theorem 4.2 By Theorem 4.1, Q) is convex in Q. R{r, (J, xat, Q, C) 
in (4.3) is a concave function in Q. 
Theorem 4.3 By Theorem 4.1, Z饥:CN,Q) is convex in Q. It implies that, 
for any marginal production cost level c, rE[^] — Q, H{C)) is a con-
cave function in Q and hence, by (4.5), the optimal TOQC Q**{c) exists. 
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4.3 The Computability of the Optimal TOQC 
Solving (4.5) is equivalent to find Q**{x) = argminQ>o[Z'^{xN, Q, H{c))] 
as rE[^] is a constant. To compute the optimal TOQC for each supplier's 
production cost c, we can first apply the standard dynamic programming 
algorithm to find {St, S^), which are independent of Qt (by Theorem 1 of Chen 
and Krass [11]). So, we can fix (5't, S^) and find Q** in order to minimizes 
the Hence, the optimal TOQC Q**(c) for any production 
cost level c is computable. 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have stated the required modifications for integrating 
the entry-fee reverse auction and the multi-period replenishment model with 
TOQC. A new buyer's expected profit function has been formulated. The 
existence and the computability of the optimal TOQC Q**{c) of the new 
setting have also been proved for any production cost level c. With the 
above results, the entry-fee reverse auction and the multi-period inventory 




The Revised Model 
In this section, the revised model of the entry-fee reverse auction in the multi-
period replenishment setting with TOQC is presented. A numerical example 
for the revised model will also be given. 
5.1 The Entry-fee Reverse Auction in the Multi-
period Setting with TOQC 
In the revised model, the buyer will hold an entry-fee reverse auction for 
selecting a supplier at the beginning of the contract periods. When deciding 
the TOQC and the unit purchasing price, we take those multi-period op-
erational costs into consideration. And the buyer is assumed to follow the 
optimal replenishment policy with TOQC to place orders periodically. The 
goal of the buyer is to identify a procurement strategy that maximizes her 
expected profit. 
The buyer first announces a commitment-payment schedule (P(Q) func-
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tion), which specifies the amount the buyer will pay for each possible value of 
commitment. This business opportunity is likely to be valued differently by 
different suppliers, with the lowest-cost supplier achieving the highest valua-
tion. The supplier offering the highest up-front, lump-sum fee wins the bid, 
determines the optimal quantity, delivers the goods to the buyer and receives 
payment according to the pre-announced commitment-payment schedule. 
Without introducing any confusion, notations in Chapter 3 are 
reused except 
0 ( c ) - the buyer's T O Q C 
Q,c) — the buyer's expected revenue for Q units of input, where 
风 r, e, Q, c) = r 別 e] - ^^(^iv, Q, H{c)) + H{c)Q{c) from (4.3) 
P{Q) 一 the commitment-payment schedule specifying the amount the buyer 
pay for each possible value of commitment 
^ - the sum of demand for all the periods 
Note that, = � a n d then = EIO^U 
And all the assumptions stated in Chapter 3 are kept except 
R{r, Xjv, Q, c) is proved to be a concave function in Q by Theorem 4.2. 
Notice that the notations marked with * are optimal to the winning sup-
plier, and the notations marked with ** are optimal to the buyer. 
Take any payment function P( . ) with F(0) = 0. Define 
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v{c) = m^xP{Q)-cQ (5.1) 
as the valuation function of suppliers. Supplier i values the business 
opportunity at v{ci) = for z = 1, 2, • • • , n. 
Since the supplier's marginal costs are independent and identically ran-
dom variable, the values Vi are independent and identically distributed ran-
dom variables. Consequently, the problem of choosing a supplier is like selling 
an object (the right for entry) to the highest bidder, where the bidders have 
independent, identically distributed valuations. From the revenue equiva-
lence theorem, the buyer obtains the same expected lump-sum fee from the 
the same supplier if she uses either the English auction, the Dutch auction, 
the sealed high-bid auction or the Vickrey auction. 
The winning supplier gets the right to decide the TOQC and achieves the 
maximized profit by setting the TOQC equals 
Q*(c) = argmaxQ>oP(Q) - cQ. (5.2) 
Suppose the buyer uses the English auction for supplier selection. That 
is, the suppliers openly bid on the fee they are wiling to pay for the right to 
trade. Clearly, the supplier with the highest valuation (the lowest marginal 
cost) wins the auction and pays a lump-sum fee equal to the valuation of the 
second-lowest-cost supplier. And let 
Vk = v(Ck),k = l,2,--- ,n. (5.3) 
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Thus, the buyer collects a lump-sum fee, V2, from the lowest-cost supplier. 
This supplier determines the TOQC Q*(Ci) to maximize his profit. The 
trade gives the buyer revenues in the amount of R(r ,^ ,x jv ,Q*(Ci ) ,Ci ) but 
costs her P(Q*(Ci)). Therefore, the buyer's profit is 
n = - P m C i ) ) + 1/2. (5.4) 
Since T/i = P(0*(Ci) ) -CiQ*(Ci) , 
n = - CiQ*(Ci) — (Fi - F2). (5.5) 
We can also easily notice that - V2 is the winning supplier's profit. 
Note from the optimization problem in (3.2) that Q*(c) is decreasing in c. 
Let Co be the minimum c with Q*(c) = 0. If Q*(c) > 0 for all c G [c,c], then 
set Co 二 c. For any c > c。，Q*{c) = 0 and thus v{c) = 0 since P(0) = 0. If 
the lowest cost Ci > Co, the winning supplier will also make zero TOQC and 
get zero profit. On the other hand, if any c < Co, Q*(c) > 0. Differentiating 
v(c) = P(Q*(c))-cQ*(c), 
v(c) 二 — 0*(c) 一 cO*'(c). (5.6) 
As the winning supplier will choose an optimal Q* to maximize his profit, 
the first order condition for the optimization problem in (5.1) will lead to 
尸'(Q*(c)) = c. (5.7) 
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Insert it into (5.6) , we get 
v'(c) = -Q*(c ) . 
So, the winning supplier's profit equals 
Vi - = v{Ci) - v{C2) = / Q*{c)dc. (5.8) 
Notice that the expected system-wide profits can be expressed as 
j:[R(r丄 XN,Q1C),C) 一 cQ*(c)]/(i)(c)c/c. (5.9) 
The supplier's expected profit equals 
E[V, - V2] = J\v, - V2]fii){c) = E j : Q � � d x dc. (5.10) 
And the buyer's expected profit equals 
E[n] = £ ( [ i ? ( r ,C ,x ; v ,Q* ( c ) , c ) - cQ* ( c ) ] - [V,-V2])f i i ) {c)dc. (5.11) 
Using the conditional probability density function of C2 given Ci = c (See 
Appendix B), the winning supplier's expected profit equals 
E[V, - V2] 
= i f n F ^ m - 二 (J: Q* � 广 
二 f^nF\c)dcf;Ul'Q^ix)dx)in - l)F'(y)(l -
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=JlnF'{c)dc^{f^F'{y){l - F ( y ) " y ) ( n — l)Q*{x)dx 
=£nF'{c)dcJ~\- /；(! — F ( y ) r , ( l - F(2/)))(n - l)Q*{x)dx 
二 - l)Q*{x)dx 
=f_:nnc)dcf:c(l — F{x)r-'Q*{x)dx 
= f^Q*{x)nF{x){l-F{x)r-'dx. 
Substituting this expected value of Vi - V2 into equation (5.11)，we find that 
the buyer's expected profit equals 
率]=r[ i? (r ,^ ,x ;v ,Q*(c ) , c ) -5 (c )Q*(c ) ] / ( i ) (c )dc (5.12) 
JC 
where H{c) = Or by (4.1), 
ElU] = [\rE[^] — Q*(c), 5(c)) ] / ( i ) (c)dc. (5.13) 
-JC 
Note that H{Ci) represents as the virtual marginal cost 
of procurement 
for the retailer in the equilibrium point of the game. That is, the buyer 
supposes that the winning supplier with the lowest production cost Ci will 
ask for H{Ci) as the pre-unit procurement price. By Myerson [28], it is 
well known that E[H{Ci)]=丑[C2] (See Appendix C). Moreover, the above 
regularity holds if and only if H{c) is an increasing function, which we assume 
throughout the paper. See Chen [10] for a discussion and further references 
on the topic. 
Although the above expression is obtained under the assumption that 
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the buyer uses the the English auction to select a winning supplier, we know, 
from the revenue equivalence theorem, that the same expression holds if she 
instead uses the Dutch auction, the first-price, sealed-bid auction, or the 
Vickrey auction. 
We define 
Q**(c) = argmaxQ>o[R{r,^,XN,Q,c) — H{c)Q]f^i^{c)dc (5.14) 
or 
Q**(c) = argmaxQ>o[rE[^] - Q, ^(c) ) ] , Vc G [c, c] (5.15) 
as the optimal TOQC that the buyer hopes to receive. 
By Theorem 4.3, for any marginal production cost level c, the function 
rE[^] — Q*(c), H{c)) is a concave function in Q. It ensures the exis-
tence of global optimum Q**{c). 
By Theorem 4.2, Q, c) is a concave function in Q. Together 
with H{c) is increasing, the global optimum Q**{c) is decreasing in c. Set 
c* equal to the minimum c G [c, c] with Q**{c) = 0. If no such c exists, set 
c* = c. c* is called the reserve price and represents the maximum production 
cost level acceptable to the buyer. For any c > c*, the TOQC the buyer 
wants equals zero. 
However, the right to decide the TOQC is in the hand of the winning 
supplier. If the winning supplier also follows this TOQC function Q**{c) 
based on her marginal cost c, Q**{-) arises as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
in the auction. In order words, a Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists if the 
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buyer's desired T O Q C function Q**{c) matches with the supplier's desired 
T O Q C function Q*{c). The reserve cost c* equals Co if the above condition 
holds. Moreover, it is clear from (5.12) that the buyer's expected profits are 
maximized. 
Now, the only question left is whether the winning supplier follows the 
T O Q C function Q**{c) based on her marginal cost c. Remind that, in real-
ity, the buyer should first announce a commitment-payment schedule {P{Q) 
function) and let the winning supplier to choose her desired T O Q C Q*. By 
substituting Q**{c) into the first order necessary condition for optimality of 
the supplier's valuation function (5.1), which is equal to 
F (Q**(c)) = c，Vc e [c,c] with Q**(c) > 0, (5.16) 
the buyer can drive the winning supplier to follow the T O Q C function Q**(c). 
And we denote this optimal commitment-payment schedule by P**(Q) 
Note that this optimal payment function P**{Q) is increasing in Q and a 
concave function in Q because Q**{c) is decreasing in c, and independent of 
the number of bidders n. 
5.1.1 Numerical Example 
We will use the following example to illustrate the model: 
Example 3: A retailer is planning to hold a reverse auction to satisfy the 
demand of a product for next four periods. Ten qualified suppliers have been 
invited to join the auction. The supplier's marginal production costs are 
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drawn from a uniform distribution between [14,15]. So, 
if 14 < c < 15, / � = < ^ 1 5 - 1 4 ) - -
0 otherwise， 
and 
0 if c < 15， 
作 ) = 織 if 1 4 < C < 1 5 , 
1 if 16 < c. 
The virtual marginal cost of procurement for the retailer is 
H{c) = c + F ( c ) / F ' ( c ) 
二 广 I ( c - 1 4 )丨 1 
一 （ 1 5 - 1 4 ) Z ( 1 5 - 1 4 ) 
二 2 c - 14. 
For the retailer, the periodic demand is normally distributed with a mean 
p 二 30 and a standard deviation a = 6. The spot market price for the 
product is found to be 17 dollars per unit. The linear shortage cost is 5 dollars 
per period. The linear holding cost is 2 dollars per period. Any inventory 
left gets zero salvage value. And the product is sold to end customers at 
retail price p = 18 dollars per unit. 
For any supplier's production cost level c, by Q**{c) = argmaxQ>o— 
Q, the corresponding Q**{c) can be found. 
The optimal T O Q C function Q**{c) with respect to each c is shown in 
figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: (Example 3) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis). 
As shown in figure 5.1, for any production cost level c, the buyer's ex-
pected profit is a concave function in Q. When the supplier's production 
cost equals 14, the retailer should make TOQC = 111.2 in order to get the 
highest expected profit 358.4 dollars. 
By (5.13), the buyer's highest expected profit equals 356.53. 
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Figure 5.2: (Example 3) The relationship between the optimal T O Q C and 
the supplier's production cost level. 
Figure 5.2 shows that the function Q**(c) 二 一3c2 + 79.8c - 418.05. It is 
estimated by the quadratic regression model and get the coefficient of deter-
mination = 0.9994. The percentage lost of the buyer's highest expected 
profits due to estimation is 0.00008 percent. 
The commitment-payment schedule is then the solution to 
= c ,VcG [c,c] with (5**(c) > 0 
^ ' ( Q ) = 1 3 . 3 + ^ 3 7 . 5 4 - 0.33(5. 
Since P**{0) = 0， 
户 = 13.30 — 2(37.54 — 0.33^ )^ /2 + 460. 
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Finishing the above analysis, the retailer will announce the above commitment-
payment schedule P**{Q). This business opportunity is likely to be val-
ued differently by different suppliers, with the lowest-cost supplier achieving 
the highest valuation. The supplier offering the highest up-front, lump-sum 
fee wins the bid, determines the TOQC, delivers the products to the buyer 
and receives payment according to the pre-announced commitment-payment 
schedule P**(0). 
5.2 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, an entry-fee reverse auction in a multi-period replenishment 
setting is formulated. In the decision-making process, the buyer assumes 
that the optimal dynamic inventory policy is used to replenish the goods 
periodically and operational costs are taken into consideration. The lowest 
unit price of the goods and the optimal TOQC are then determined jointly. 
The buyer (the auction organizer) can achieve the highest expected profit if 
she follows this optimal procurement strategy. A numerical example is given 




In the first part of this chapter, we will compare the fixed-quantity reverse 
auction with the entry-fee reverse auction. For the second part, we will 
investigate the relationship between the trend of the supplier's production 
cost and the duration of each reverse auction. 
6.1 Comparison between the Fixed-quantity 
Reverse Auction and the Entry-fee Re-
verse Auction 
To hold reverse auctions for multi-period operations, many buyers just first 
set the TOQC Q � t h e same as the expected demand throughout the periods. 
So, a buyer run an auction to identify a supplier that can deliver the quantity 
at the lowest cost. We refer to this strategy as the fixed-quantity reverse auc-
tion. In this section, we will try to compare the gap of the buyer's optimal 
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expected profit between the model of the fixed-quantity reverse auction and 
our entry-fee reverse auction. How the profit gap depends on some of the 
model parameters will also be discussed. 
Example 4: A retailer is planning to hold a reverse auction to satisfy the 
demand of a product for next four periods. Two procurement officers are 
assigned for this task. They find that the supplier's marginal production 
costs are drawn from a uniform distribution between [14,16] and the periodic 
demand is normally distributed with a mean ^ = 50 and a standard deviation 
a = 12. The spot market price for the product is found to be 17 dollars per 
unit. The linear shortage cost is 5 dollars per period. The linear holding cost 
is 2 dollars per period. Any inventory left gets zero salvage value. And the 
product is sold to end customers at retail price p = 18 dollars per unit. Ten 
qualified suppliers have been invited to join the auction. 
Procurement officer A is planning to hold a fixed-quantity reverse auction 
with the TOQC the same as the expected total demand for next four periods, 
which is 200. But Officer B is arguing that it is better to hold the reverse 
auction in an entry-fee form. The reason for that is it brings a higher profit 
as the price and the optimal TOQC of the product are decided jointly. 
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Officer B has made the following numerical analysis to support the argu-
ment. 
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Figure 6.1: (Example 4) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis). 
Looking at Figure 6.1, compared with the profit levels for the fixed quan-
tity Qo 二 200, the optimal TOQC decided by the entry-fee auction provides 
higher expected profit for the retailer in each production cost level. 
Fixed-quantity Entry-fee Incresae 
Retailer's expected profit 587.73 dollars 642.39 dollars 9.3 percentage 
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The highest expected profit obtained by using the fixed-quantity reverse 
auction is 587.73 dollars and that for the entry-fee reverse auction is 642.39 
dollars. The percentage increase is 9.3 percentage. 
The key reason for the profit gap between the two strategies include: 
1. Using the entry-fee reveres auction model, the retailer can determine 
the corresponding optimal TOQC for each supplier's possible produc-
tion cost level. By doing so, the retailer can obtain the highest expected 
profit. However, the TOQC inside the fixed-quantity reverse auction 
model is a input parameter, but not a decision variable. This suggests 
the reason why there is a profit gap between the two strategies 
2. The TOQC is fixed in the fixed-quantity reverse auction and is not 
influenced by operational costs (including purchasing cost, holding cost, 
shortage cost etc.) throughout the periods. It incurs informational loss. 
Looking at this evidence, officer A finally accepts that the entry-fee form 
give higher profit than the fixed-quantity form in this case. 
What's more, officer B discovers that the gap between two strategies is 
affected by some model parameters. 
6.1.1 Number of Supplier 
Officer B finds that a larger gap is observed if there are fewer suppliers join-
ing the auction. 
Number of suppliers 10 20 
Percentage increase in retailer's expected profit 9.3 8.0 
63 
CHAPTER 6, NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
• ......... ..�.— r ..... ....... 
： . : :………… 
. . : • . … … . . . .… ； i ； ； ； 
i ...：............： ....:…......j....................丨 
……....I …… . : . . . . . . …： . . . . . . ：……........：..…..........： 
,.；.. • •.： ‘； •：• •• - t . •…… ：•• ……....：......... i 600-1 ...•.•. . — � ^ 、 ： 
： 丨 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
.......... .... I . . . . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ . . . . . . . 
0 - ......... . 一 . . . . . ^ V . . . . . . . . . 
；： . . . i •• - j 丨 ： ： ： 
- 2 0 0 - ... , ……：：: …了 ； 
/ : : ,:.,::.......... .. ....： • :.:::......... ....../ 
- 4 0 0 - / 15.5 
•：/ ：••：.................丄 / 
• •• •• …•…•‘ …••• / _ 
- 6 0 0 -•丨。 厂 15 
... ./: :,:…… 一.... / 
-BOC^——/ .… .… .产 
Figure 6.2: (Example 4) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with a larger number of supplier 20. 
In this example, the overestimated cost for a TOQC is higher than the 
underestimated cost. So, the optimal TOQC of the entry-fee reverse auction 
is less than the expected total demand. When there are fewer suppliers 
joining the auction, the distribution of C： becomes more broader with a 
higher upper value. The higher the value of Ci, the higher the overestimated 
cost for each TOQC and the lower the optimal TOQC. It implies that the 
optimal TOQC is farther away from the expected total demand. Since the 
expected profit function is concave in TOQC, the profit gap between the two 
strategies is larger. 
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6.1.2 Retail Price 
In addition, officer B finds that a larger gap is observed when the retail price 
is lower. 
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Figure 6.3: (Example 4) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with a higher retail price 18.5. 
Retail price 18 18.5 
Percentage increase in retailer's expected profit 9.3 7.6 
When the retail price is lower, the cost side plays a relatively larger role 
in determining the expected profit, implying that the informational loss for 
operational costs becomes larger. So, the profit gap is larger. 
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6.1.3 Coefficient of Variation for Demand Distribution 
Lastly, officer B finds that a larger gap is observed if the coefficient of varia-
tion for the demand distribution is higher. 
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Figure 6.4: (Example 4) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with a lower coefficient of variation for demand distribution 10/50. 
Coefficient of variation for demand 10/18 12/18 
Percentage increase in retailer's expected profit 7.0 9.3 
When the coefficient of variation for the demand distribution is higher, 
it incur more operational costs. The cost side plays a relatively larger role 
in determining the expected profit. It implies that the informational loss 
for operational costs becomes larger. So, the profit gap between the two 
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strategies is larger. 
6.1.4 Average Improvement 
More samples are used to compare the two strategies. The result are sum-
marized in Table 6.1. 
Sample Retail price coeff of variation cost range No. of supplier Percentage 
i p a/fjL [c, c] n increase 
1 I 18 I 10/50 14，15 I 10 6.0 
2 18 10/50 一 14, 15 20 5.7 
3 18 10/50 — 14, 16 10 7.0 
4 18 10/50 — 14，16 20 6.1 
5 18 12/50 一 1 4 ， 1 5 1 0 8.0 
6 18 12/50 14, 1 5 2 0 7.4 
7 18 12/50 1 4 ， 1 6 1 0 9.3 
8 — 1 8 12/50 一 14, 16 20 8.0 
9 — 18.5 10/50 一 14, 15 10 5.1 
10 18.5 10/50 一 14，15 20 4.8 
11 — 18.5 — 10/50 一 14, 16 10 5.9 
12 — 18.5 10/50 一 14, 16 20 5.1 
13 18.5 — 12/50 14，15 10 6.6 
14 一 18.5 一 12/50 14，15 20 ~ 6.2 “ 
15 — 18.5 12/50 14, 1 6 1 0 7.6 
16 18.5 12/50 14，16 I 20 6.7 
Table 6.1: (Example 4) The percentage increase of the retailer's expected 
profit between the fixed-quantity reverse auction and the entry-fee reverse 
auction. 
The percentage increase ranges from 4.8 to 9.3 percent, with an average 
at about 7 percent. To conclude, as shown in the table, a larger percentage 
increase is observed when 
1. there are fewer suppliers joining the auction 
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2. the retail price is lower 
3. the coefficient of variation for the demand distribution is higher 
6.2 Duration of the Entry-fee Reverse Auc-
tion Cycle 
Our model gives the buyer the right to choose the duration of each auction 
cycle, e.g. 6 months or 12 months. As discussed in Chapter 1, if the buyer 
expects the purchasing price can be reduced in near future, she will reduce 
the number of period for each cycle. In extreme, the buyer holds a reverse 
auction every period. On the other hand, if the buyer expects the purchasing 
price remains the same or even rises due to fierce shortage, a single reverse 
auction should be used to serve non-stationary demands in a longer duration. 
Example 5: The procurement manager of a retailer is planning to hold an 
entry-fee reverse auction to discover the price of a product and at the same 
time, to decide the the TOQC of the product for the next half year. The 
retailer discovers that the spot market price for the product is 17 dollars 
per unit and the product can be sold out at retail price 18 dollars per unit. 
The linear holding cost is 2 dollars per month. The linear shortage cost 
is 5 dollars per month. Any inventory left gets zero salvage value. Monthly 
demand follows normal distribution with a mean 50 and a standard deviation 
10. 
There are ten suppliers trying to bid in the auction. The supplier's cost 
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of production follows an uniform distribution within the range [14.5，15.5]. 
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Figure 6.5: (Example 5) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with the supplier's production cost [14.5, 15.5] for 6 months. 
As shown in the figure 6.6, for any production cost level, the buyer's 
expected profit is a concave function in Q. When the supplier's production 
cost equals 14.5, the retailer should make TOQC 二 278 in order to get the 
highest expected profit 806.8 dollars. 
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Having found the optimal TOQC for each production cost level, the re-
tailer can calculate her highest expected profit by (5.13). In this example, 
the highest expected profit of the buyer equals 797.63. 
After a while, the retailer suddenly notices that the range of supplier's 
production cost will be reduced in coming 6 months. The predicted range of 
production cost for coming 6 months is presented in the following table. 
Month Production cost range 
1-2 [14.5, 15.5] 
3-4 [13.5, 14.5] 
5-6 [12.5, 13.5] 
The procurement manager immediately revises his strategy. An entry-fee 
reverse auction will be held every two months. 
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For the first two months with production cost [14.5，15.5], 
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Figure 6.6: (Example 5) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with the supplier's production cost [14.5，15.5] for 2 months. 
The optimal expected profit of the buyer equals 215.73 dollars. 
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For next two months with production cost [13.5, 14.5], 
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Figure 6.7: (Example 5) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with the supplier's production cost [13.5, 14.5] for 2 months. 
The optimal expected profit of the buyer equals 310.96 dollars. 
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For the last two months with production cost [12.5, 13.5], 
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Figure 6.8: (Example 5) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with the supplier's production cost [12.5, 13.5] for 2 months. 
The optimal expected profit of the buyer equals 408.81 dollars. 
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Month 1 I 2 3 | 4 5 | 6 Total profit 
Range of production cost [14.5，15.5] [13.5, 14.5] I [12.5, 13.5] 
Retailer's optimal expected profit— 215.73 310.96 408.81 935.50 
Range of production cost [14.5, 15.5] 
Retailer's optimal expected profit 797.63 | 797.63 
Table 6.2: (Example 5) Change of the retailer's optimal expected profit if 
the purchasing price is reduced in coming 6 months. 
For the new strategy, the total expected profit of the buyer equals 215.73+ 
310.96 + 408.81 = 935.50 dollars. Compared with the expected profit for 
holding an auction every six months, the percentage increase in profit equals 
(935.50 - 797.63)/797.63 = 17.28 percent. It confirms the statement that if 
the buyer expects the purchasing price can be reduced in near future, she 
will reduce the number of period for each cycle. 
After 6 months, the supplier's cost of production follows an uniform dis-
tribution within the range [12.5, 13.5]. The procurement manager is still 
planning to hold entry-fee reverse auctions every 2 months. 
However, unluckily, the retailer suddenly notices that the range of sup-
plier's production cost will be raised in coming 6 months. The predicted 
range of production cost for coming 6 months is presented in the following 
table. 
Month Production cost range 
7-8 [12.5，13.5] 
9-10 [13.5, 14.5] 
11-12 [14.5, 15.5] 
The procurement manager immediately revises his strategy. An entry-fee 
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reverse auction will be held every six months. 
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Figure 6.9: (Example 5) The relationship between the TOQC (x-axis), the 
supplier's production cost (y-axis) and the retailer's expected profit (z-axis) 
with the supplier's production cost [12.5, 13.5] for 6 months. 
Using the new strategy, the optimal expected profit of the buyer equals 
1388.2. 
By Table 6.3, compared with the expected profit for holding an auc-
tion every two months, the percentage increase in profit equals (1388.2 — 
935.50)/935.50 = 48.39 percent. It confirms the statement that if the buyer 
expects the purchasing unit price remains the same or even rises due to fierce 
shortage, a single reverse auction should be used to serve non-stationary de-
mands in a longer duration. 
75 
CHAPTER 6. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
Month I 7 I 8 9 | 10 11 | 12 Total profit 
Range of production cost [12.5, 13.5] [13.5, 14.5] [14.5，15.5] 
Retailer^s optimal expected profit 408.81 310.96 215.73 935.50 
Range of production cost [12.5, 13.5] 
Retailer's optimal expected profit 1388.2 1388.2 
Table 6.3: (Example 5) Change of the retailer's optimal expected profit if 
the purchasing price is increased in coming 6 months. 
6.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, two series of numerical studies have been carried out. The 
first one tells us that, when compared to a fixed-quantity reverse auction 
without considering any operational costs, this model gets an average of 
about 7 percent profit improvement. Another study confirms the statement 
that if the buyer expects the purchasing unit price remains the same or even 
rises due to fierce shortage, a single reverse auction should be used to serve 




Factors of Success for Holding 
the Entry-fee Reverse Auction 
This chapter is provided for those interested in running electronic reverse 
auctions in the future. We will state some factors of success for holding 
electronic reverse auctions. 
7.1 Internal Organizational Infrastructure of 
the Buyer 
Many purchasing professionals reported to Smeltzer and Carr [34] that the 
greatest advantage of reverse auctions was that it drove organizations to 
implement strategic sourcing. Reverse auctions is served as the catalyst 
for a thorough analysis of the company's purchasing process and ultimately 
resulted in the implementation of strategic sourcing. They concluded that 
the organization must have professionals who understand and can implement 
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this process. 
Moreover, in our model, a reverse auction is used to serve the demands 
for several periods. In this sense, the buyer must be able to forecast those 
demands accurately. If the forecasts are inaccurate, the entire auction mech-
anism may not be effective. 
Also, in order to consolidate purchase volume, appropriate technology 
must be employed to make communication across organizational divisions. 
7.2 Supplier's Qualifications and Control 
Before holding an electronic reverse auction, it is important to ensure all po-
tential suppliers are qualified. Sometimes, suppliers present bids below their 
production cost. And in other situations, suppliers present bids for greater 
quantities that they could possibly deliver. Quality problem is another major 
problem that the buyer should pay attention to. All of these are the reasons 
why pre-qualification is so important. 
After holding a reverse auction, the buyer also needs to keep tracks with 
the winning supplier's performance and give useful advice. They should also 
set up some contingency plans for any unforeseen problems. 
7.3 Attractions of the Entry-fee Reverse Auc-
tion for Suppliers 
Getting suppliers on board with reverse auctions is not as easy as it sounds. 
It has become significantly more difficult to convince suppliers to participate 
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in it since some of them have had some bad experience on reverse auctions. 
The most important thing the buyer should work on is to let her sup-
pliers understand that reverse auctions is actually a "win-win" approach to 
buyer-supplier negotiations. The buyer should clearly state the benefits her 
suppliers can get. Some will be stated as follows. 
For suppliers, participating in the strategic sourcing process is an easy way 
to reduce "Selling, General and Administrative Expenses". Without paper 
work, electronic reverse auctions also helps suppliers reduce cycle time. The 
suppliers can also be able to plan a better production schedule and reduce 
excess inventory levels because less time is lost for the paper work. 
In reality, incumbent suppliers may win a larger share of their client's 
business when buyers consolidates their total purchasing volume over several 
locations and plants. Moreover, with reference to Beall et al. [6], incumbent 
suppliers actually win nearly half of the electronic reverse auctions in which 
they participate. 
According to Smeltzer and Carr [34], in the past, many suppliers knew 
little about the market's pricing structure. They might set a price that could 
be too low while still maintaining some profits. As more price information 
are provided during auctions, suppliers may get the chance to gain more by 
raising the price of those under-priced products. 
Moreover, according to Beall et al. [6], suppliers can also get constructive 
feedback from the buyer as to why they won or lost the business. 
Based on the suggestions of Iasta.com Inc [20], there are three other mea-
sures helping the buyer attract potential suppliers to join reverse auctions. 
First, it is essential for the buyer to make sure that the RFQ is compete, 
79 
CHAPTER 1. FACTORS OF SUCCESS FOR HOLDING THE 
ENTRY-FEE REVERSE AUCTION 
well-written and contains critical information to allow suppliers to get a bet-
ter sense of the buyer's philosophy and outlook on supplier management. 
This might include: 
1. good overview of the company and its supplier development programs 
2. a statement that describes the company's philosophy on the strategic 
sourcing process 
3. a discussion on when, how, and why the buyer uses reverse auctions 
4. history behind the goods or services as well as an explanation of why 
they are now up for bid. 
The more comprehensive the initial RFQ is, the more likely it will be 
for suppliers' willingness to participate in reverse auctions. Smaller suppliers 
with limited staff are hesitant to devote resources to joining reverse auctions 
when the information appears superficial, incomplete or even inaccurate. 
Second, it is important to provide suppliers with context so as to win 
their participation and boost their enthusiasm. The buyer should announce 
what she wants to achieve (e.g. a certain percentage saving, better quality, 
lower defect rate, better fill-rate, on-time delivery). The buyer should be as 
specific and honest as they can. 
Third, the buyer should constantly communicate with the supply base. 
She has to develop strong working relationships with her suppliers and iden-
tify and address their concerns. Some suppliers have had a negative expe-
rience in reverse auctions, but it does not necessarily mean that they are 
not qualified to bid. The buyer should take time to find out if she can 
80 
CHAPTER 1. FACTORS OF SUCCESS FOR HOLDING THE 
ENTRY-FEE REVERSE AUCTION 
overcome the suppliers' concerns. Empathy and understanding should be 
demonstrated. The buyer may also take specific steps to make the suppliers 
feel more comfortable with the bidding process. Rapid responses to suppliers' 
concerns should also be provided. 
7.4 Procedural Fairness 
Sometimes the buyer may make post-auction price negotiations. The win-
ning supplier who was not selected in the end will complain about the loss 
and the time she spent on preparing for the reverse auctions. The supplier 
may take legal actions against the buyer. This may cause the buyer's addi-
tional costs and give her poor reputations in her industry. More or less, this 
also damages their future relationships. In this sense, Daly and Nath [12] 
promoted procedural fairness in auctions. It includes explicit and clear rules, 
transparent and impartial selection process and accessible information. 
7.5 Total Cost Analysis 
Last but not least, according to Emiliani and Stec [16], some buyers have 
found that reverse auctions sometimes lead to higher costs in purchasing or 
other departments. For example, new suppliers that are unable to meet qual-
ity or delivery performance targets will lead to unanticipated costs incurred 
by buyers, including 
1. returns 
2. warranty costs 
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3. litigation expenses 
4. overnight freight charges 
5. increased oversight of suppliers 
6. lost sales 
7. shortage costs 
Anderson and Katz [2] also pointed out some buyers fail to consider 
1. supplier's economics of scale 
2. other supply chain costs, such as transportation cost 
3. the buyer's cost of acquiring and managing products and services 
Moreover, the fixed cost for holding reverse auctions and the cost saving 
due to long-term relationship should also be considered. Therefore, a total 
cost analysis at the company level should be conducted periodically. It helps 
the buyer see the full picture and make relevant improvements. 
7.6 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, the factors of success for holding the entry-fee reverse auc-
tion are stated. From another point of view, these are the major difficulties 
in implementation. The buyer need to take care of her internal organiza-
tional infrastructure, supplier's qualifications and control, attractions of re-




Many procurement experts advocate reverse auctions as an important strate-
gic sourcing device. Existing studies of reverse auctions in the operations 
management literature consider only the newsvendor setting. Therefore, a 
single reverse procurement auction in a multi-period setting with inventory 
decisions has been explored in this thesis. Based on the definitions of Ab-
erdeen Group [1], this thesis has integrated the strategic sourcing with oper-
ational procurement. To sum up, on the side of strategic sourcing, the buyer 
can hold an entry-fee reverse auction to determine the optimal TOQC and 
the lowest unit purchasing price jointly, taking into consideration of opera-
tional costs under the optimal replenishment policy. The ultimate TOQC 
and price decisions come from both sides of the trade: the buyer specifies 
the commitment-payment schedule and the auction rule on the one hand, 
and on the other, the suppliers bid for entry-fee with their private cost in 
mind. The winning supplier is the one willing to pay the highest entry fee 
and is given the decision to make the quantity decision. The buyer can utilize 
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the payment function to influence the winning supplier's quantity decision in 
order to maximize the buyer's expected profit. And on the side of the opera-
tional procurement, the buyer is assumed to follow the optimal replenishment 
policy with TOQC to make orders periodically. 
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows: 
1. The importance, the benefits and the factors of success for holding 
reverse auctions have been stated. 
2. The model of a single entry-fee reverse auction in a multi-period re-
plenishment setting has been formulated. The required modifications 
to the buyer's expected profit have been proposed. The existence and 
the computability of the optimal TOQC have also been proved. 
3. Two series of numerical studies have been carried out. The first one 
tells us that, when compared to a fixed-quantity reverse auction without 
considering any operational costs, our model gets an average of about 
7 percent profit improvement. Another study confirms the statement 
that if the buyer expects the purchasing unit price remains the same or 
even rises due to fierce shortage, a single reverse auction should be used 
to serve non-stationary demands in a longer duration, or vice versa. 
There are many ways to extend the auction model studied here. One is to 
explore the situation that production exhibits economies of scale. Another 
possibility is to introduce the fixed cost of holding an auction and the non-
stationary production cost distribution. In this case, the frequency of holding 
an auction will become one of the decision variables. 
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If a:i,X2,... is a sample with size n from continuous type distribution, we 
order it into 
YI<Y2<...<YN-
That is, 
YI = smallest of Xi ,X2, . . . , 
Y2 = 2nd smallest of Xi,X2, • •., Xn-
YN 二 largest of xi, ^2 , . . . , 
The event that the rth order statistics K is at most y, V； < y, can occur iff 
at least r of the n observations < y. 
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APPENDIX A. ORDER STATISTICS 
Gr{y) = PiVr < y) 
fc二 r 
= J 2 i ^ C k ] [ F { y ) n i - F { y r - ' + [i^fe)广 （A.l) 
k=r 
k=r 
+ ^^[nCkmy)]'{n - k)[l - ⑷ 广 [ 一 / ⑷ ] 
k=r 
(A.2) 
Since [nCk][k] = (&_”?(!几―；^)! and [nCk][n - k] = (二_”!，the 2nd term 
(/c = r + 1) of the 1st part of gr {y) = negative of the 1st term {k = r) of 
the 2nd part of gr{y) and so on...And the last term of 2nd part of g r { y ) = 
negative of the 3rd part of gr{y)-
Therefore, 
9r{y) 二 (卜 …)！剛广1 丨1 — ( A . 3 ) 
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Appendix B 
Conditional Order Statistics 
We can easily verify that F{C2 = y\Ci = x) = 广). 
By (A.3), the density function of this conditional order statistics equals 
(p � ( n - 1 ) ! � i ^ f a ) _ i ^ ( a : ) l i - i 
船=船=工）=(1 —1)!(,一1-1)![ 1 —尸⑷ 
�1 F{y)-F{x)r-'-' r F'{y) • 
1 - F{x) \ U-^(^). 
—(n-1)! r F'{y) 
—(n-1)! \{l-F{y)f-'F'{yy 
= ( ^ T ^ [ J R ^ F I X ) ) - - ' • • 
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Appendix C 
Virtual Marginal Cost of 
Procurement 
In the entry-fee reverse auction, the supplier with the highest valuation (the 
lowest marginal cost) wins the auction and pays a lump-sum fee equal to the 
valuation of the second-lowest-cost supplier. H{Ci) is the virtual marginal 
price the winning supplier ask for if its production cost equal Ci. The follow-
ing proof shows us that the expected virtual marginal cost requested by the 
winning supplier equals the expected production cost of the second-lowest-
cost supplier. 
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APPENDIX a VIRTUAL MARGINAL COST OF PROCUREMENT 
EMC,)] = £ H l ^ ] 
=E[Ci] + j : n[l - F{x)Y-^F{x)dx 
=E[C,] — J \ [ n { n — 1)[1 - F{x)r-\-F'{x))F{x) 
+n[l — F{x)]''-^F'{x)]dx 
=E[C,]^E[C2]-E[C,] 
= E [ C 2 L 
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